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ABSTRACT
Systems tests in Martin Marietta's Space Simulation Laboratory at
Denver are now conducted with greater confidence. Planning and early
systems checkout tend to preclude unpleasant surprises. Safety is
part of the design and operation; examples are over-temperature kills,
gimbal stops, and proven procedures and personnel. However, full-up
thermal balance tests using the solar simulator, temperature control
of infrared sources, the gimbal, a large number of thermocouples, and
other requirements for a high fidelity thermal balance are still a
challenge.
Add to this such things as several new members in the operating
crew, combining development, qualification and acceptance testing in
one test, exceeding the maximum deslgn intensity of the solar simulator,
an extremely tight test schedule impacting interface control and defini-
tion, a unique gimbal control requirement, and the test really becomes a
challenge. This was the P78-2 (SCATHA) Satellite thermal balance test.
The lessons we learned in meeting this challenge is the subject of
this paper.
The test was successfully conducted with minimal delays, and the
P_8-2 (SCATHA) Satellite was launched successfully.
I NTRODUC TION
Surely another typical spacecraft thermal vacuum test report is
repetitlou_! Yet, if it involves something new and different or is
significant in some other way, the story should be told. No one thing
about this test was new or particularly outstanding. HowCw'r, so many
things seemed to be working against a troub|efree, successful test that
weaknesses in our state of readiness and approach to the test became
highly visible. Many tests have been conducted before and after this
one. These involved few problerm_ which were readily resolved. The
high degree of se'_cess in conducting the subsequept tests has led us
to believe that although problems will always be with us and accidents
are not 'llways prevented, their probability has been greatl: reduced
by the lessons learned in testing tt_ P78-2 satellite. The satellite
in the Space Simulation Laboratery (SSL) 29'x65' thermal vacuum chamber
is shown in Figure I.
* ,_ktrtin Marietta Corporation, Ik.nver Division
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THE LABORATORY'S STATE-OF-READINESS
About two years had elapsed since the last major systems thermal vacuum
test had been conducted. A skeleton staff had maintai" "d the facility during
this period, but not adequauely since most of their ti had been spent running
component and subsystem tests. Enough of the remaining member_ of the staff
were retalned by being placed on other assignments to keep the capability of
cmducting a systems test. However, we all became rusty, and although we went
through a retraining and recertification program, we still lacked the confidence
that only several recent tests could provide.
The other aspect of readiness was the faciliLy. It too did not have _he
advantage of recent use. Tc gel it ready, a refurbish plan was deceloped and
implemented. In fact, refurbishment of the solar simulator, which was known
to be critical regarding mairtenance and reliability, was started over a year
before the first t,_st requiring its use and about a year and a half before this
test. It is shown in Figure 2 with some of its capabilities. The original
performance characteristics of the system were attained, measured, and documented.
Thlrty-two kilowatt Xenon arc lamps were then obtained to replace the center
seven twenty kilowatt lamps to reach the required intensity of 1.4 solar con-
stants with a nominal fifteen p_rcent margin. We ran a thermal vacuum test on
an antenna and t_o brief development tests using the solar simulator a_,d the
chamber, and felt we were ready for the upcoming P78-2 tests, except for one
item. rh_s item was tile programmable c,mtrol system for tile two-axis gimbal
depicted in Figure 3. We etarted checking out the control system about a year
before it was needed on this test. Our mistake here was in not fully recognizing
the difficulty in repairing old one-of-a-kind digital control systems. With
the suppliers' support, we started troubleshooting and continued on our own
_,nce he was not able to maintain hls support due to other comm_ ments.
Bv this t fine we were to the point where other requirement:; pertaining
to the elmbal be_;,m co,,petin_ with the repair of the control systr_-, for use
of the :4imbal. These requirements were a take-un reel, a partia: glmbal st:rot, d,
and a safet:¢ .;top for the g{mbal, l,imited access to the gimbal caused the
these requirements and the control]or repair to be delayed to the cxtent that
their verification was -.or adequate due to schedule constraints, rlowever,
lack o,¢ rood int,,lface to establish its long-term reliability contvol was even
more of a problem.
INTERFACE PROBI,EMS
'I'hou_h we had era, loyed the established methods of interface control with
a te.-_t plan, test procedures, fixture drawin,_;s, det_'lled schedule_ and other
interface documents and meetings, we still fell far short of the needed inter-
face control.
One Interface problem that caused an overni-ht delay was :in interference
between the spacecraft and the partial shroud installed on the gtmbal t'hat
pre,".uded installati,m of the spacecraft on the tImbal. A dest_;n error caused
in part by ch.mgin._ desl<ners was not detected. Almost unbelievably, th-_'
identical dimensional error was made k.htn dimensional checks were .'nade to
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verify proper clearances. Once the problem was detected when installing the
spacecraft, the error was still difficult to find but could have been uncovered
earlier had the interface dimensions been checked specifically by both the
laboratory and the project as part of the design check
Reflections of the solsr beam from flat surfaces of multilayer insulation
(MLI) back up to the co]l_mating mirror and back down to th_ spacecraft and
monitoring radiometers were of much higher intensity than had been anticipated.
See Figure 2 This caused the electrical power to the solaz simulator to
be significantly less than normal for the intensities indicatpd by the _dio-
meters. In spite of the fact that temperatures and other parameters from the
spacecrsft also indicated the solar intensity was slightly low, the correct
decision to go with the radiometers was made. Flight data indicate the thermal
environment simulation was quite close.
These are just two of _he several interface problems encountered during
this space simulation test program. They are, however, representative cf two
types of interface problems, one mechanical and the other environmental. One
of the other interfaces we did not establish and work was the project to labo-
ratory interface, especially before the test. No one laboratory engineer nor
one program engineer was assifned as the primary one responsible for keeping
both parties completely informed and making sure all interfaces were addressed
and worked. The laboratory did have one person assigned but much was worked
around him which made his task extremely difficult. Had tile program and the
laboratory provided primary points of contact, problems would have been resolved
earlier.
The three aforementioned interface problems were those that were most
significant for the laboratory. Others that the laboratory was sensitive to
wore:
o Contamination monitoring
Instrumentation interfaces
o Aeceleratlon of satellite by gimbal
o Quality Control involvement in laboratory operations
& configuration
o Safety responsibility - satelllte and SSL
o Access control
o Lab schedule
o Customer/Lab interface
o Building humidity and temperature control requirements
This llst is an example of considerations a laboratory must address.
Up to this point in time, we had not had a formal intecface control docu-
ment (ICD) for test programs. However, previous tests were either much more
simple or like Viking, had much more extensive preparation including development
and thermal models in which the interfaces could be developed and verified. A
formal ICD will not el_minate all interface problems, but it will certainly
focus attention on the interfaces.
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IA,;SSONS 1,EARNED
The len_:th of time ,rod intensity of trainin,.; to retrain or train ,m
t'.xt)t'rienccd tcchuic[,l_ t)I tql}_[tlk'L'l" [O I'C ,l competent metal)el _)( tilt' opet',tt[il)_
crew who can fill tilt' positions for which he is certified with confidence
has been underestimated. While no specific problems were attributed
to lack of personnel capabilities° ,m overwhelllling stress w;is placed oil the
l,,w experienced Inembers of the SS1, staff to meet the needs of the test.
A training program has been prepared and is bein:; implemented to augment the
on-the-job-trAining nor,nally employed.
Perhaps even more difficult than the maintenance of skills is the main-
tenance of the facility. Keeping a facility of this type up to meeting the
demands of teday's test requirements with the available skills, time, and budget
is indeed a challenge, ltere again we felt we were refurl;ishing tile facility
to a like-new condition, ttowever, a few months and tests later, a whole new
set of failure modes began to appear requiring the utmost from the operating
crews to keep tile facility on-line ,rod :,t_,,t[ng the test parameters. A lot of
statistical data is not available for these one- or few-of-a-kind system which
'hakes needed nlatntenance budget and replacement frequency hard to estimate.
The state-of-readiness of the laboratory must be maintained so programs come
to a safe, reliable facility for space simulation tents. Redundancy, reliability,
,i good spare parts inventory, ,rod ,i well maintained system are necessary to
assure minimum risk to the item being tested Anti to tile test program.
given the space simulation facility and its staff are capable of preparing
for and conducting successful tests, poor Interface control can still lead to
trouble. Even with the severai problems of our crew and facility, we could 1,ave
eliminated several problems in the P78-2 thermal balance test with better Inter-
face control, t4e certainly learnt, d tile need for a comprehensive ICl) for all
major svstenls test. We feel this is tile most significant lesson learned from
the 1'78-2 test.
A good commuIltcation interface both before ;lad during tile test is also
critical. We found that tile Interface during the test has been more than
sufficient but when the test requirements are being develuped And transmitted
to the laboratory, the interface can be quite inadequate. Subsequent test
pro£r,uns have gone very well due prim,lrilv to a stroll)', conmlunic,tt ion link.
CONCI,[] S I ON
,qp,lCC a. ,nulation test pl'oV, r,llllS C,ill be carried out wtlh a high i_robabil i tv
of heine, troublefree with a competel_t staff, ,i well-malnt,lined test facility
and attcnl ion to [llterfaces. The P78-2 (Sc,tth,I) satel 1 [te was successful lv
tested with one interrupt[ell and a four-day abbreviated rcte,qt to verify d
modificat ion. This WAS acconll_lishe-I Ill spite of the new tent crew, a facility
beset with sew, ral opL'ratiollal I_roblems, and marginal t.nterface control.
These prob lelllS h,ve been ,iddrcssed wt th very good result s. ,qul_sc(tuent test s
have been highly successful.
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+Figure I. 1'78-] SatelJito It_ (:hamber
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Fi,_ure 3. Two Axis Gin,bal
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